Sustaining the buyout governance model: inside secondary management buyout boards by Jelic, Ranko et al.
Sustaining the buyout governance model: 




Jelic, R., Zhou, D. and Wright, M. (2019) Sustaining the 
buyout governance model: inside secondary management 
buyout boards. British Journal of Management, 30 (1). pp. 30-
52. ISSN 1467-8551 doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
8551.12301 Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/73310/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12301 
Publisher: Wiley 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 




Sustaining the Buyout Governance Model:  







 and M. Wright
c) 
a
 University of Sussex, School of Business, Management and Economics, Brighton, BN21 9SL, UK; 
R.Jelic@sussex.ac.uk; 
b
 University of Reading, Henley Business School, Whiteknights, Reading, RG6 6UD, UK; 
dan.zhou@henley.ac.uk;  
c








We examine the impact of private equity (PE) directors and their human capital on operating 
performance in a unique hand collected sample of 200 secondary management buyouts 
(SMBOs) during 2000-2015. We show that PE directors’ human capital tends to play 
statistically and economically important role in performance. Financial (rather than 
operational) experience of PE directors in acquiring PE firms tends to have a substantial 
impact on post-SMBO profitability while high level business education is especially 
important in post-SMBO growth performance enhancement. Complementary expertise, 
provided by directors in buying and selling PE firms, plays an important role only in post-
SMBO growth improvements. Overall, our results provide evidence that governance benefits 
of the buyout model tend not to be exhausted in the primary buyout stage but the effects in 
the secondary buyout phase depend on the nature of PE directors’ human capital resource, 
notably in respect of the balance between board monitoring and advisory roles. Our study 
therefore adds to growing evidence on how ownership and life-cycle nature of firms affect 
sustainability of boards fulfilling their roles. The results are robust to sample selection bias, 
different types of PE firms and different measures of human capital. 
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1. Introduction  
Management buyouts and related transactions represent an important organizational 
ownership innovation enabling firm reconfiguration and reinvigoration to maintain 
performance (Ahlers et al., 2016; Toms, Wilson and Wright, 2015). Buyouts enhance 
corporate governance compared to prior owners as board and management changes 
(Cumming, Siegel and Wright, 2007), leverage and the alignment of managerial and 
shareholder incentives address agency issues (Jensen, 1989). In a secondary management 
buyout (SMBO), the initial (primary) buyout is acquired by new private equity (PE) 
financiers. SMBOs oftentimes involve changes to board membership including replacement 
of PE directors and existing chief executive (CEO) and chief financial (CFO) officers whilst 
companies remain in private ownership rather than being acquired in a strategic sale or going 
public. SMBOs are an ownership structure and governance mechanism that has grown in 
importance since the financial recession. By 2015, the extent of SMBOs was at parity with 
primary buyouts (CMBOR, 2016).  
 
Despite growing research (Siegel, Wright and Filatotchev, 2011; Wang, 2012), there is a 
paucity of studies on SMBO corporate governance and the role of PE partners and executives 
on boards (PE directors). This is an important omission in light of the heated debate about 
short-termism and the nature of performance in PE backed buyouts (Goergen, O׳Sullivan and 
Wood, 2014; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; PSE, 2007; Wood and Wright, 2010). Yet SMBOs 
represent a means to sustain the buyout organizational form over time and hence a novel 
context to examine the sustainability of corporate governance in the context of ownership 
evolution.  
Evidence on SMBO underperformance would be consistent with the hypothesis that agency 
cost reduction and other benefits associated with the buyout model are exhausted in the 
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primary buyout (Arcot et al., 2015; Degeorge, Martin and Phalippou, 2016). However, while 
previous studies report mixed evidence on SMBO performance (Achleitner and Figge, 2014; 
Bonini, 2015; Jelic and Wright, 2011; Wang 2012, Zhou, Jelic and Wright, 2014) they pay 
little attention to whether the SMBO has effective governance mechanisms, especially 
relating to board expertise. The ownership change in SMBOs represents a distinctive firm-
specific characteristic that may impact the effective composition of boards yet understanding 
is lacking. 
 
The nature of the corporate governance exercised by boards to sustain a firm may be 
contingent on firm-specific characteristics (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013; Zona, Zattoni 
and Minichilli, 2013). As such, there may be a need to adopt complementary theories to 
understand the appropriate nature of governance (Filatotchev, 2006). Regarding SMBOs, this 
suggests a need for complementary theories to traditional agency theory. Human capital 
resources of outside directors are associated with monitoring and advice which link to 
strategic decision-making and firm performance (Tian, Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2011). 
The strategic entrepreneurship perspective (Ireland, Hitt and Sirmon, 2003) suggests that PE 
directors monitor managers but also provide advisory resources to help in identifying and 
exploiting growth opportunities (Meuleman et al., 2009; Wright et al., 2000). SMBO 
performance may be associated with managers’ and PE firms’ motivation to employ their 
idiosyncratic knowledge, skills, experience, and capabilities to this end opportunities beyond 
the initial buyout. New blood injected into the board on SMBO, through new and more PE 
board representation, may enhance the firm’s ability to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. 
There may thus be complementarity between the need to maintain agency based monitoring 
and the need to enhance the strategic entrepreneurship based advisory role in terms of the 
available human capital resources. Hence, our first research question is: how is PE 
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involvement on the board associated with post-SMBO performance and how is this affected 
by SMBOs of underperforming primary buyouts?  
 
Human capital brought by outside board members may vary considerably (Knockaert and 
Ucbasaran, 2013; Acharya et al., 2013). Prior research (Degeorge, Martin and Phalippou, 
2016) treats PE directors as a homogenous in SMBOs with a focus mainly on their financial 
monitoring skills. Yet, some PE partners and executives may be better at financial monitoring 
and cost-cutting while others may be better at exploiting growth opportunities. We argue that 
the variety of human capital of PE directors impacts differently on monitoring and advising 
managers to reduce agency costs and exploit growth opportunities with consequences for 
post-SMBO performance. Hence, our second research question is: how does the nature of PE 
board members’ human capital affect SMBO performance?  
 
Using a unique hand collected sample of 200 SMBOs, we find that presence of PE directors 
improves SMBOs performance. PE expertise particularly matters for performance 
improvement in poorly performing buyouts. PE directors’ financial experience and high level 
business education substantially impact post-SMBO profitability and growth, respectively. 
High level business education is especially important in the post-SMBO performance 
enhancement. PE directors’ operational experience fails to contribute to post-SMBO 
performance.  
 
We contribute firstly to the literature f that suggests that the nature of corporate governance 
sustainability is related to the context in which it occurs by exploring the changing nature of 
corporate governance in the case of management buyout type transactions over time. Second, 
we add to the emerging literature on the dual role and human capital composition of boards 
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which acknowledges the importance of recognizing firms’ heterogeneous ownership 
structures (Zona, Zattoni and Minichilli, 2013). By examining SMBOs we show that rather 
than a simple linear move from resource contribution to monitoring (Eslayed, 2010), the 
sustainability of boards’ ability to fulfill their roles (Goergen and Renneboog, 2014) depends 
on how they evolve their skills composition over time. Third, we contribute to calls to adopt 
multi-theoretical approaches to the study of boards (Filatotchev, 2006; Zona, Zattoni and 
Minnichilli, 2013) by extending the traditional agency theory approach to incorporate the 
strategic entrepreneurship perspective as a complementary theory in the SMBO context 
(Meuleman et al., 2009).  
 
2. Theory background and hypotheses development 
2.1 Strategic entrepreneurship vs. agency perspective 
Agency theory suggests the superiority of buyout structures is rooted in high leverage, 
enhanced managerial incentives and active PE firm monitoring and intervention (Jensen, 
1989). PE partners and executives sit on the board to monitor managers closely to ensure 
they focus their efforts effectively (Cornelli and Karakaş, 2013). Accordingly, performance 
improvement is mainly attributed to efficiency gains from reducing agency costs. However, 
high leverage and close financial monitoring may restrict the decisions to pursue growth 
opportunities associated with risky projects (Rappaport, 1990). Hence, agency theory fails to 
address the upside potential of buyouts (Wright et al., 2000). 
 
The strategic entrepreneurship perspective complements agency theory (Meuleman et al., 
2009). Using growth as an important indicator of entrepreneurship (Delmar, Davidsson and 
Gartner, 2003), this perspective recognizes the importance of resources and capabilities in 
identifying and exploiting growth opportunities to create value (Hitt et al., 2001). It also 
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suggests the importance of an effective board in ensuring the efficiency of strategic and 
entrepreneurial actions (Ireland et al., 2001). The competence and skills of board members 
are thus essential (Hendry, 2005) and boards need to have a mix of skills (Zattoni and 
Cuomo, 2010; Zona, Zattoni and Minnichilli, 2013). In buyouts, PE partners and executives 
acting as directors may stimulate entrepreneurial growth through both monitoring 
management efficiency and providing resources and capabilities (Wright et al., 2000). First, 
managers with resources and capabilities to identify and exploit growth opportunities are 
motivated and monitored by PE directors to pursue risky growth opportunities to create value. 
From agency theory, greater managerial ownership may decrease firm value due to 
entrenchment and managerial risk aversion (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Managers 
may reject risky projects with high profit potential (Wright et al., 2000). Close monitoring by 
PE directors may mitigate this problem.  
 
Second, PE directors may provide complementary resources and capabilities to management 
by advising on growth opportunities (Wright et al., 2000). PE firms’ rich deal and sector 
experience play a significant role in improving post-buyout performance (Cressy, Munari and 
Malipiero, 2007; Harris, Siegel and Wright, 2005). Outside investors can provide 
entrepreneurial firms with resources and capabilities they lack (Filatotchev, 2006). Pressure 
resistant investors (Eslayed, 2010), like PE investors, may have a longer-term perspective 
enabling them to focus on improving growth performance through entrepreneurial actions. PE 
partners and executives as directors may therefore complement inside managers by 
facilitating access to critical resources and capabilities for growth (Meuleman et al., 2009).  
 
Agency theory is silent on the human capital of PE directors. Human capital in the strategic 
entrepreneurship perspective is critical to the resources and capabilities needed for growth 
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opportunities (Ireland, Hitt and Sirmon, 2003). Accumulated from education and in-job 
experience, the expertise and skills represent individuals’ know-how regarding competing in 
the industry, and in identifying and exploiting entrepreneurial activities (Barney, 2014; 
Becker, 1975).  
 
Directors with more, high quality human capital provide more effective monitoring and 
advice resulting in better performance (de Villiers, Naiker and van Staden, 2011). Human 
capital resources of outside directors are crucial for growing companies in helping strategy 
development and providing resources for growth, when incumbent management face resource 
and capacity scarcities (Clarysse, Knockaert and Lockett, 2007). Outside directors with 
complementary human capital resources can add substantial value in this direction (Kroll, 
Walters and Wright, 2008).   
 
However, empirical evidence is lacking on the human capital of PE partners and executives, 
except for Acharya et al. (2013) on primary buyouts and Degeorge, Martin and Phalippou 
(2016) on SMBOs which find that financial and operational experiences of PE partners/firms 
contribute to financial returns. These studies mainly focus on investment performance at PE 
firm level, not addressing whether human capital of PE partners and executives contributes to 
SMBO operating performance at portfolio company level. Focusing on the PE firm as a 
whole ignores the contribution of the human capital of individual PE partners (and other PE 
firm executives) as directors of a particular SMBO.  
 
This is crucial because PE firms usually allocate a subset of PE partners and others to manage 
one buyout who take board seats, providing monitoring and advice based on their own 
knowledge and experience. Their human capital may differ from the human capital of PE 
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firm partners as a whole. Treating the PE firm as homogeneous thus overlooks the human 
capital heterogeneity among PE directors. We aim to address these gaps. Finally, it is not only 
PE partners involved in deals and are represented on boards. Our definition of PE directors 
includes people on PE firms’ payrolls that may not necessarily be partners. Examining only 
PE firms partners at the PE firm level as a whole misses important aspects of the PE skills 
applied to specific deals. 
  
Accordingly, we argue that PE directors act as monitors and advisors to reduce agency costs 
(agency theory) and facilitate identifying and exploiting profitable growth opportunities 
(strategic entrepreneurship perspective). Human capital of PE directors impacts the 
effectiveness of both monitoring and advising (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Knockaert and 
Ucbasaran, 2013). Within the SMBO context, the dual roles of PE partners and executives 
on the board, and their human capital, is likely to be crucial.  
 
SMBOs continue the buyout organizational form to another life-cycle phase, implying 
resolving agency issues to obtain efficiency improvements should not be the main way for 
investors to enhance performance. Monitoring by PE directors may still be important in this 
secondary phase as introducing new PE investors and managerial entrenchment from their 
increased ownership and reduced monitoring by PE directors can create agency problems 
(Achleitner, Figge and Lutz, 2012; Degeorge, Martin and Phalippou, 2016). However, if 
efficiency gains in the primary buyout have largely been exhausted, there may be need for a 
greater advisory role of PE directors for entrepreneurial growth opportunities. These 
conditions call forth a need for SMBO boards and PE directors in particular to comprise 
both monitoring and adding value skills. From a strategic entrepreneurship perspective, there 
is likely a need for the SMBO board to possess idiosyncratic expertise to mobilize resources 
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to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities successfully. There is thus a complementarity 
between agency and strategic entrepreneurship perspectives in understanding the role of PE 
directors in SMBOs (Wright et al., 2000). The heterogeneous human capital resources of PE 
directors may help in understanding their abilities in implementing the dual role to improve 
performance.  
 
2.2 PE partners and executives on SMBO’s board (PE directors) 
Following on from the above arguments, management in SMBOs may have greater discretion 
to search for and pursue riskier growth opportunities, especially if hubris leads them to enter 
areas beyond their existing expertise, with adverse implications for performance. 
Alternatively, managers with a high level of ownership may be concerned with wealth 
preservation and reject risky projects with upside growth potential (Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1988). Therefore, to avoid managers taking actions against their interests, PE firms 
may insist on the presence of their PE partners and executives on SMBO boards to closely 
monitor strategic decisions.   
 
PE directors may also help develop strategies to bring the SMBO to its next stage through 
exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities where further potential performance improvements 
from efficiency gains in the primary buyout are limited. In SMBOs where expansion is the 
main goal, new PE directors may bring new knowledge, skills, and resources and contribute 
to top management growth-oriented decision-making and strategy development (Bruining 
and Wright, 2002).    
 
In addition, SMBOs may be driven by PE firms’ overinvestment incentives and are more 
likely to be bad deals (Arcot et al., 2015) since selling PE firms would have an informational 
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advantage and may try to sell underperforming portfolio companies. Buying PE firms under 
money-burning pressure would rely on due diligence conducted by the selling PE firms and 
make concessions. Under this scenario, the presence of PE directors, together with new 
appointments, are particularly important (Chahine and Goergen, 2011). Taking board seats 
helps PE directors understand the company better, allowing scrutiny of management’s 
strategic initiatives, and reducing failure likelihood (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). 
Monitoring and advisory expertise of PE directors will likely focus on turning around 
primary buyouts that under-performed through active board involvement focused on closing 
poorly performing areas, improving operational efficiencies and reinvigorating areas with 
growth potential. Overall, the greater the need for turnaround and/or growth input the greater 
the expected presence of PE director appointments. Hence,   
 
Hypothesis 1(a): The fraction of PE directors is positively related to post-SMBO performance 
in terms of profitability and growth. 
Hypothesis 1(b) SMBOs’ performance in the primary stage negatively moderates the positive 
relationships between the fraction of PE directors and post-SMBO performance in terms of 
profitability and growth.     
 
2.3 Human capital of PE directors   
Depending on the importance of monitoring and advisory roles, PE directors need to possess 
different skills (Zahra et al., 2009). A mismatch between the skills of PE directors and the 
needs of the firm can create problems (Wright et al., 2001). We consider two distinct sources 
of human capital: work experience and education. VC research shows that directors from VC 
investors provide financial and operational knowledge and expertise to portfolio companies 
(Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013). Financial expertise is especially relevant to financial 
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monitoring skills and cost-cutting. In SMBOs, performance improvement may come from 
finance PE directors closely monitoring the firm’s ability to service the higher debt typical of 
SMBOs and through further cost-reductions not identified by management and previous PE 
directors.  
 
However, tight financial control may constrain the flexibility needed for entrepreneurial 
growth (Wright et al., 2001). Rather, operational expertise may better provide advice about 
operational and managerial issues to help companies achieve organic growth. Some SMBOs 
may need support from operational PE directors in strengthening core products and markets. 
PE partners and executives may bring deep sectoral knowledge and experience of operational 
and managerial challenges, helping existing management in operational improvements to 
generate revenue growth.  
  
The level of formal education is positively related to receptivity to innovation (Zona, Zattoni 
and Minnichilli, 2013). Although they will have gained some exposure to standard financial 
control techniques, high level business education is distinctive in providing understanding 
and influence over the administrative complexity and sophistication of organizations 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984), as tools to address the uncertainty of companies and markets 
so as to identify and exploit growth opportunities that will enable the firm to achieve a 
strategic competitive advantage (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Highly educated managers are 
also prone to make more acquisitions than others (Palmer and Barber, 2001). Some SMBOs 
may need advice on plans to enter new markets, as well as to diversify the product and 
customer offerings via strategic acquisitions. Such decisions require expertise relating to 
competitive market dynamics, economies of scale and scope, etc. that are the foci of high 
level business education.  PE directors with such education may be better at advising on 
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operational and strategic decisions and in facilitating the right acquisitions to help growth.   
 
The balance between board monitoring and advisory roles may need to change across 
different company life-cycle phases (Aguilera et al., 2008), with implications for the mix of 
board expertise. The move from primary to secondary management buyout represents such a 
life-cycle shift. Performance improvement in SMBOs may come from complementary 
resources and expertise provided by buying PE firms’ directors compared to those of selling 
PE firms’ directors. Selling PE directors focusing on efficiency improvement may only have 
financial expertise, while buying PE directors with operational expertise for revenue growth 
or high level business education resources for acquisitions may further enhance performance. 
Additionally, SMBOs growing to the next life stage may require different resources and 
capabilities for further growth. Selling PE directors may only be able to exploit the ‘low 
hanging fruit’ in terms of growth opportunities, while buying PE directors with more 
resources and high level expertise and capabilities can identify and exploit further growth 
opportunities. Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 2a: SMBOs with PE directors with specific human capital in terms of previous 
work experience in finance will have better post-SMBO performance in terms of profitability. 
Hypothesis 2b: SMBOs with PE directors with specific human capital in terms of previous 
work experience in operations will have better post-SMBO performance in terms of growth. 
Hypothesis 2c: SMBOs with PE directors with specific human capital in terms of a high level 
of education in business (MBA) will have better post-SMBO performance in terms of growth. 
Hypothesis 3a: SMBOs with PE directors with complementary human capital to selling PE 
directors in terms of previous working experience in finance will have better post-SMBO 
performance in terms of profitability. 
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Hypothesis 3b: SMBOs with PE directors with complementary human capital to selling PE 
directors in terms of previous working experience in operations will have better post-SMBO 
performance in terms of growth. 
Hypothesis 3c: SMBOs with PE directors with complementary human capital to selling PE 
directors in terms of previous experience in terms of a high level of education in business 
(MBA) will have better post-SMBO performance in terms of growth. 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data and sample description 
The Centre for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR) database was used to identify UK 
SMBOs. PE backing, together with PE firms entry and exit dates, was obtained from 
Thomson One Banker and Zephyr. Accounting information was collected from FAME. We 
excluded companies from the finance sector due to their different accounting reporting.  
 
To obtain data on board compositions from 3 years before to 5 years after SMBO 
transactions, changes in top management, and biographical information for each PE director, 
we combined sources including Amadeus, annual reports, Thomson One Banker, Zephyr, 
deal announcements, Bloomberg business week website (http://investing.businessweek.com), 
PE firms’ websites, Linkedin, and Zoominfo. We obtained a final sample of 200 UK SMBOs 
backed by PE firms in both primary and secondary stages during 2000-2015. Acharya et al 
(2013) use interview data related only to the leading PE executives in a sample of large and 
mid-cap deals, backed by large PE houses. We consider all PE executives on the board and 
both small and large deals. On average, we track 1.3 strictly PE-related individuals per deal 
which compares favorably to Acharya et al. (2013). The mean for “PE-network” directors per 
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deal is 0.24.  
 
Figure 1 presents the yearly distributions of sample SMBOs by entry and exit. Popularity of 
SMBOs during the sample period with a sharp drop in the number of entries in 2008, is 
consistent with other worldwide (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2015) and UK studies (Zhou, Jelic 
and Wright, 2014).  
 
Figure 1: Sample distribution across years  







Consistent with Degeorge, Martin and Phalippou (2016) we find SMBOs are larger and more 
leveraged investments (see Table 1). Average (mean and median) for SALG and EMPG are 
positive both in the primary and secondary buyout stages. Unreported results suggest that 
whilst profitability significantly improves during the primary phase (from Y-3 to Y-1) growth 
performance remains statistically unchanged. The difference in pre/post average (mean and 
median) unadjusted ratios is negative and statistically significant for ROA and EMPG.  
 
Table 1: Primary buyouts vs. SMBOs 
 Primary phase SMBO Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median T-test MW test 














GEAR  124 63 134 70 10 7 
ROA 6.7 7.6 -4.8 1.9 -0.115** -0.057*** 
ROS 2.2 4.9 -11.8 3.7 -0.140 -0.011 
SALG 4.5 5.9 1.0 2.6 -0.035 -0.033** 
EMPG 7.0 5.3 2.2 2.0 -0.048*** -0.033*** 
Notes: Primary phase includes a period from -3 to -1 years before SMBO transaction. SMBO includes a period 
from +1 to +5 years after SMBO transaction. TA total assets (in £ million). GEAR (%) is sum of long term and 
short term debt divided by the total equity. ROA (%) is company’s earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 
scaled by the total assets in the same year. ROS (%) is company’s earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 
scaled by the total sales in the same year. EMPG (%) is the difference between the company’s end of year 
number of employees in year t and year t-1, scaled by the average of number of employees in year t and t-1. 
SALG (%) is the difference between the company’s sales in year t and year t-1, scaled by the average of sales in 
year t and t-1.  
 
We rank PE firms on the basis of the reputation score established by Jelic (2011). Regarding 
PE firm reputation we find that sample SMBOs are predominantly backed by PE firms 
outside the top 10 (i.e. less reputed) (Table 2). This finding contradicts Degeorge, Martin and 
Phalippou (2016) but is consistent with Strömberg (2008), Harford and Kolasinski (2013) and 
Arcot et al. (2015). Arcot et al. (2015) suggest that less reputed PE firms may be under 
pressure to engage more in SMBOs to establish a track record. 
 
Table 2: PE firm reputation   
 Primary phase SMBO 
Top 10 PE firms 61 23 
Other PE firms 139 177 
Notes: this table presents the numbers of sample SMBOs backed by Top 10 PE firms in primary phase and 
secondary stage, respectively.  
 
Consistent with other studies (Lerner et al. 2002 as cited in Cornelli and Karakaş, 2013), we 
find that not all PE firms are represented on boards. Specifically, this was the case in 21 
smaller SMBOs backed by large PE firms with many portfolio companies (e.g. 3i). 
 
We classify sample buyouts into 8 broad industries, in line Gompers et al. (2008). Business 
Services (37%) is the largest industry group, followed by Consumer (30.5%) and Business 
and Industrial (17.5%). 
 






1. Internet &Computers 5 2.5 
2. Communications  & Electronics 7 3.5 
3. Business & Industrial 35 17.5 
4. Consumer 61 30.5 
5. Energy  3 1.5 
6. Biotech and Healthcare 11 5.5 
7. Business Services 74 37 






Results in Table 4 suggest significant differences in governance and human capital between 
sample buyouts in their primary and secondary phases. For example, PE firms engaged in 
SMBOs increase board size (LNBS) and their representation on boards (PED). They also 
bring more experience-based expertise (Finance and Operation) together with experts with 
MBA degrees.  
 
Table 4: Changes in governance 
 Primary phase SMBO Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median T-test MW test 
LNBS 1.66 1.7 1.71 1.79 -0.05*** -0.09*** 
PED (%) 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.2 -0.05*** -0.03*** 
Finance(no.) 0.61 0 0.88 1 -0.27*** -1*** 
Operation(no.) 0.24 0 0.34 0 -0.10*** -0.00*** 
MBA(no.) 0.16 0 0.24 0 -0.08*** -0.00*** 
Notes: Primary phase includes a period from -3 to -1 years before SMBO transaction. SMBO includes a period 
from +1 to +5 years after SMBO transaction. All other variables defined in the paper. 
  
 
3.2 Performance, PE boards and human capital  
We use two sets of performance measures: profitability and growth. Profitability, measured 
by return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS), has been widely used in the buyout 
literature to examine efficiency improvements associated with financial monitoring and 
agency costs reduction (Guo, Hotchkiss and Song, 2011). However, profitability cannot 
capture the entrepreneurial growth activities that lead to revenue growth and firm size 
growth. Hence, following previous literature (Meuleman et al., 2009; Cressy, Munari and 
Malipiero, 2007), we adopt two widely used growth ratios, employment growth (EMPG) and 




We use the ‘change’ model of Barber and Lyon (1996) to measure abnormal performance 
ratios of profitability (AROA, AROS), employment growth (AEMPG), and sales growth 
(ASALG). Thus, abnormal performance is the difference between actual and expected post-
SMBO performance. Expected performance is a company’s median performance, during 3-
years before SMBO, adjusted for the performance change in a respective industry: 
  
𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸 (𝑃𝑖𝑡)                 (1) 
 
where, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the actual performance ratio of company i in year t during post-event (years, +1 
to +5) periods ; 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) is the expected performance of company i in year t; and 𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the 
abnormal performance for the performance ratio (AROA, AROS, ASALEG, AEMPG). We 
compare performance in each year post event with pre-SMBO performance, for a period up 
to five years.
 
We exclude the event year 0, as it includes both pre-and post- event operations 
which are difficult to distinguish. 
 
Our expected performance model also follows Barber and Lyon (1996): 
 
  𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡)  =  𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  ∆𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡           (2) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘  is pre-SMBO performance of company i.  𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡  is defined as the industry 
performance for company i in period t. ∆𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡  is the difference between industry control 
group’s performance in period t and the industry’s median pre-SMBO performance. The 
industry performance was calculated based on accounting data on UK private companies. The 
relevant accounting data of all UK private companies (22,163) was collected from FAME and 
represents our industry benchmark. We then classified companies into 8 industries and 
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calculated the median value as the industry performance (PIit).   
 
Involvement of PE partners and executives is measured as the percentage of PE directors on 
the board (PED). Our human capital variables are measured based on biographical 
information. As Degeorge, Martin and Phalippou (2016) and Acharya et al. (2013), we 
identify each PE director for whether s/he had worked in finance, accounting, or banking 
(financial experience) or whether s/he had worked in industry or management consulting 
(operational experience) before joining PE industry. For high level business education, we 
identify each PE director for whether s/he holds an MBA. Following previous literature 
(Tian, Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2011), human capital is measured as a categorical variable 
equaling 1 if one or more PE directors poses relevant experience (Financial/Operational) or 
MBA degree (MBA), 0 otherwise.  
 
To capture complementarity skills and their potential impact on value creation, we assign 
categorical variables to all cases where a buying PE firm added particular new expertise to 
the board, in secondary stage. For example, _Finance is a categorical variable that takes a 
value of 1 if the buying PE firm appointed at least one PE director with financial experience 
to the board without financially experienced PE director(s) in primary stage. Similarly, 
_Operation and _MBA depict complementarity skills related to operational experience and 
MBA degree respectively.  
 
As aforementioned, increased managerial ownership and loosened PE firm control in the 
second round may lead to management entrenchment and hence may worsen post-SMBO 
performance. We, therefore, control for management ownership (MGTSHARE). Further, 
larger companies may be more profitable than smaller ones, while smaller ones may have 
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more opportunities to grow. We control for size (LNSIZE) and industry adjusted profitability 
prior to the SMBO (Pre_ROA). Time was controlled by yearly categorical variables and a 
categorical variable for the 2008-2010 financial crisis (Crisis). We control for gearing 
(GEAR) and time to exit SMBOs (LNDURATION). High gearing can multiple effects of 
good/bad performance whilst duration controls for the fact that some of the improvements 
tend to be more time consuming.  Finally, we control for the following board-related 
variables identified in previous literature: Board size (LNBS) (O’Connell and Cramer, 2010); 
independent outside directors (Ind_outsider) (Lerner, 1995); inside directors (Insider) 
(Masulis and Mobbs, 2011); and replacement of top managers (MGTCHAN) (Gong and Wu, 
2011). Definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 1.  
 
3.3 Estimation method  
PE firms do not randomly choose buyouts in which to invest but conduct due diligence to 
select companies with certain characteristics leading to a greater probability of success in the 
SMBO phase. To address issues related to potential selection bias, we employ a Heckman 
(1979) two-step model. In the first step, we estimate a Probit regression with a robust 
variance estimate for the probability of a new PE firm’s involvement in a sample SMBO. The 
dependent variable is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the SMBO is PE-backed and 0 
otherwise. For the Probit model we therefore use a large sample of 351 PE-backed and non-
PE backed SMBOs, during the period 2000-2011. The control sample includes deals from 8 
different industries. Business Services and Consumers are the most important sources of the 
deals. The control sample is dominated by MBOs (59%). The majority (72%) of the control 
sample deals are PE-backed.  
 
The following variables are identified as important determinants of PE firm’s investments in 
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previous literature: buyout size (Strömberg, 2008); pre-event performance (Bienz, 2004); 
previous PE backing (Acort et al., 2015); buyout type (Wright et al., 2001); industry (Bayar 
and Chemmanur, 2006). We therefore hypothesize that PE firm choice to invest in an SMBO 
is associated with SMBO size (LNSIZE), pre-SMBO performance (Pre_ROA), buyout type 
(BUYIN), previous PE backing (Pre_PE) and target company industry (BSERVICES).  
 
Estimated probability of a PE firm’s investment in an SMBO (Lambda) is then included in 
the second stage to correct for selection bias. In the second step, we use random-effects 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression with abnormal performance ratios of 
profitability (AROA, AROS), productivity (ASALEMP), employment growth (AEMPG), and 
sales growth (ASALG) as dependent variables. To examine whether previous performance 
moderates the impact of PE directors on post-SMBO performance, we interact the fraction of 
PE directors (PED) with a categorical variable of poor performer (Poor_ROA). Poor_ROA 
equals 1 if Pre-ROA is below than its median value and 0 otherwise. Our preference for GLS 
over OLS is motivated by the panel method utilizing data from the entire post-SMBO period 
while OLS relies on data from only one post-SMBO year. Additionally, panel data estimation 
takes into account the effects of estimation error due to the correlation of the residuals across 
firms (Fama and French, 2001). Hausman tests for all models suggest that our dataset is 
suitable for random-effects models instead of fixed-effects models. 
 
4. Empirical results   
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 5. Consistent with previous 
studies, the negative mean values of AROA, AEMPG, and ASALG demonstrate overall 
underperformance of SMBOs. As expected, average gearing ratio of sample buyouts is high 
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(134%). On average, managers hold about 38% of shares in SMBOs. It takes, on average, 4 
years for PE firms to exit SMBOs. On average, boards consist of 6 (5.52) directors. PE 
directors with financial experience were most represented on the boards - 60% have one or 
more PE directors with financial experience. This is considerably higher than related 
percentages for PE directors with operational experience (28%) and MBA degree (21%). 
About one quarter of sample buying PE firms added complementary financial skills to the 
boards. Similarly, new appointments of PE directors with operational experience and MBA 
degree were made in 22% and 19% cases, respectively. Ind_outsiders constitute 53% of all 
outside directors. Active CEOs constitute 34.7% of all Ind_outsiders. The correlation 
coefficient between active CEO and Ind_outsiders is 0.61 which is higher than correlation of 
0.13 reported in de Villiers et al. (2011). 
 
4.2 Regression results 
Results of Probit (Panel A) and GLS estimations (Panel B) are presented in Table 6. As 
expected, buyins, buyouts with PE backing in the primary stage, and larger buyouts are more 
likely to receive PE investments (Panel A). Marginal effects (reported in brackets) suggest 
that previous PE involvement increases likelihood of a new PE backing by 25.2%. Similarly, 
buy-ins are 27.5% more likely to receive PE backing compared to their buy-out counterparts. 
Panel B presents the impact of PE directors’ (PED) on post-SMBO performance, up to five 
years after SMBO. Coefficients for PED are positive and statistically significant in models 
for growth: for example, AEMPG 5 (coefficient=0.398, p<0.06) and ASALG 7 
(coefficient=0.724, p<0.01). In models for profitability, evidence is mixed. The coefficient for 
PED is statistically significant (coefficient=0.151, p<0.03) in model 2 but not in models 1, 3, 
and 4. Economically, the variation in the magnitude of the coefficient suggests that PE 
directors matter most for employment growth (AEMPG) and sales growth (ASALG). For 
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example, one standard deviation change in PED results in 6% employment growth (model 5) 
and 11.6% growth in sales (model 7). Thus, a higher percentage of PE directors on the board 





Table 5: Sample descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 AROA -0.06 0.18 1.00 
                   
2 AROS 0.00 0.19 0.52 1.00 
                  
3 AEMPG -0.05 0.26 0.19 0.17 1.00 
                 
4 ASALG -0.08 0.34 0.21 0.19 0.55 1.00 
                
5 PED 0.21 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.01 1.00 
               
6 Finance 0.60 0.49 0.11 0.12 0.06 -0.04 0.59 1.00 
              
7 Operation 0.28 0.45 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 0.39 0.16 1.00 
             
8 MBA 0.21 0.41 0.05 0.02 0.17 0.10 0.32 0.28 0.40 1.00 
            
9  _Operation 0.22 0.42 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.28 0.07 0.76 0.30 1.00 
           
10  _Finance 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.04 -0.04 -0.11 0.16 0.41 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 
          
11 _MBA 0.19 0.39 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.28 0.23 0.34 0.82 0.33 0.19 1.00 
         
12 LNBS 1.71 0.34 0.10 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.31 0.50 0.24 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.17 1.00 
        
13 Ind_outsiders 0.06 0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.08 -0.17 -0.07 -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 1.00 
       
14 MGTCHAN 0.48 0.50 -0.09 0.03 -0.08 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 1.00 
      
15 Insider 0.66 0.19 -0.08 -0.05 -0.07 0.06 -0.69 -0.45 -0.18 -0.15 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.24 -0.24 -0.02 1.00 
     
16 MGTSHARE 0.38 0.28 0.13 0.07 -0.02 0.08 -0.21 -0.19 -0.11 -0.25 -0.03 -0.05 -0.23 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.17 1.00 
    
17 GEAR 1.34 1.74 -0.11 -0.13 -0.10 -0.12 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.07 -0.07 1.00 
   
18 LNDURATION 4.03 0.54 -0.08 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.12 -0.08 -0.12 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 0.02 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.04 1.00 
  
19 LNSIZE 3.65 1.57 -0.11 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.28 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.04 -0.02 0.15 0.23 -0.05 0.03 -0.12 -0.39 0.00 0.02 1.00 
 
20 Crisis 0.50 0.50 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.12 0.03 -0.10 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.17 -0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.24 0.02 1.00 




Table 6: Effects of PE directors on post-SMBO performance 
Panel A: 1st stage  
Probit model 
Pre_ROA 0.617 (0.166) 
BSERVICES -0.049 (-0.013) 
LNSIZE 0.517 (0.139)*** 
BUYIN 1.489 (0.275)*** 
Pre_PE 0.823(0.252)*** 
Intercept -1.580 (-0.426)*** 
Log lik. -137.372 
PseudoR
2


































AROA AROS AEMPG ASALG 
GLS model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
PED 0.069(0.071) 0.151**(0.07) 0.021(0.113) 0.093(0.094) 0.398*(0.209) 0.575*(0.303) 0.724***(0.267) 0.904***(0.256) 
PED* 
Poor_ROA 
  -0.310***(0.093)   -0.319(0.273)   -0.361*(0.214)   -0.719**(0.296) 
LNBS 0.024(0.029) 0.009(0.028) 0.016(0.052) -0.001(0.05) 0.013(0.040) 0.004(0.050) 0.021(0.064) 0.019(0.060) 
Ind_outsiders -0.011(0.104) -0.029(0.099) 0.032(0.11) -0.005(0.107) 0.445**(0.216) 0.666**(0.301) 1.068***(0.307) 1.026***(0.274) 
MGTCHAN -0.007(0.021) -0.009(0.02) 0.038(0.038) 0.038(0.037) -0.036(0.03) -0.048(0.036) 0.03(0.043) 0.029(0.039) 
Insiders -0.038(0.071) -0.037(0.065) 0.010(0.100) -0.003(0.088) 0.256(0.171) 0.322(0.24) 0.660***(0.245) 0.625***(0.230) 
MGTSHARE 0.031(0.046) 0.028(0.041) 0.019(0.05) 0.008(0.046) 0.035(0.061) 0.009(0.071) 0.052(0.08) 0.056(0.072) 
GEAR -0.025***(0.006) -0.027***(0.006) -0.024***(0.008) -0.025***(0.008) -0.009(0.01) -0.014(0.013) -0.024(0.018) -0.015(0.014) 
LNDURATION -0.035(0.022) -0.028(0.02) -0.003(0.042) 0.004(0.042) -0.01(0.039) 0.002(0.046) -0.006(0.054) -0.029(0.049) 
LNSIZE -0.002(0.014) -0.011(0.013) -0.034(0.024) -0.041*(0.025) 0.009(0.019) 0.002(0.021) 0.019(0.028) 0.013(0.026) 
Crisis -0.011(0.012) -0.011(0.012) 0.002(0.016) 0.003(0.016) -0.079**(0.033) -0.092**(0.038) -0.096*(0.052) -0.055(0.040) 
Pre_ROA -0.057(0.048)   -0.044(0.053)   -0.210***(0.065)   -0.017(0.032)   
Poor_ROA   0.184***(0.031)   0.180***(0.067)   0.102*(0.057)   0.161**(0.075) 
Lambda 0.005(0.059) -0.04(0.057) -0.205**(0.104) -0.232**(0.104) 0.045(0.090) 0.010(0.104) 0.256**(0.113) 0.210*(0.107) 
Intercept -0.105(0.282) -0.155(0.261) 0.142(0.242) 0.074(0.234) -0.154(0.268) -0.251(0.321) -1.020***(0.356) -0.901***(0.334) 
Years  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 
(%) 9.04 19.8 7.87 12.17 15.7 14.36 14.94 18.87 
Chi2 42.425*** 73.725*** 35.681** 44.554*** 190.163*** 167.260*** 93.103*** 92.477*** 
N 450 450 402 402 335 335 377 377 
Notes: This table reports the results of the panel regression corrected for sample selection bias for the effect of PE directors on post-SMBO performance, up to five years after SMBO 
transaction. The Probit regression (Panel A) with robust variance estimate is for the probability of receiving PE backing by the sample SMBOs. This model converged after three iterations. 
Marginal effects in Panel A, reported in (parentheses). The panel regression (Panel B) is for the influence of PE directors on post-SMBO performance. The dependent variables (AROA, AROS, 
AEMPG, and ASALG) are estimated as industry-adjusted abnormal performance measures. Lambda is the fitted probability of receiving PE backing, estimated from the Probit regression model. 
All the results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters of panel regressions are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error, omitted collinear covariates, and 
cluster by firm. Entry year dummies are included. P-values for the Wald test are for probability > Chi 2. N in Panel A reports the total number of SMBOs including pure and sample SMBOs. N in 
Panel B reports the number of firm-year observations in the panel regression model. * p< 10%; ** p<5%, *** p<1%. Robust standard errors of regressions are reported in brackets.  The 
variables are defined in Appendix 1.
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Interaction term coefficients (PED*Poor_ROA) are negative and statistically significant in 
the models for AROA 2 (coefficient=-0.310, p<0.01), AEMPG 6 (coefficient=-0.361, p<0.10), 
and ASALG 8 (coefficient=-0.719, p<0.02). The significantly negative coefficients imply 
poorly performing buyouts require more PE expertise to improve growth, measured by 
AEMPG and ASALG. This supports hypothesis 1(b).  
 
Considering the impact of the human capital resources of PE directors on post-SMBO 
performance, Table 7 shows coefficients for financial experience (Finance) are positive and 
statistically significant in models for profitability: AROA 1 (coefficient=0.058, p<0.02) and 
AROS 3 (coefficient=0.096, p<0.05). Thus, presence of PE directors with financial experience 
has a positive effect on post-SMBO profitability, supporting H2a. There is no statistically 
significant impact of operational background (Operation) on post-SMBO performance; hence 
H2b is not supported. Coefficients for presence of PE directors with an MBA (MBA) are 
positive and statistically significant in models for growth: AEMPG 5 (coefficient=0.117, 
p<0.03) and ASALG 7 (coefficient=0.188, p<0.01), supporting our expectations of the impact 
of high level business education on post-SMBO growth ratios. One standard deviation change 
in Finance increases AROA (AROS) by 2.8% (4.7%). One standard deviation change in MBA 
results in about a 4.8% increase in AEMPG and 7.7% increase in ASALG. As to 
complementary human capital, the results show that one standard deviation change in 
_MBA increases AROA, AROS, AEMPG, and ASALG by 2%, 3.5%, 4.2%, and 5.6%, 




Table 7: Effects of the human capital of PE directors on post-SMBO performance 
 GLS model AROA AROS AEMPG ASALG 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Finance 0.058**(0.023)   0.096**(0.047)   0.072(0.071)   0.000(0.081)   
Operation 0.001(0.019)   0.025(0.03)   -0.018(0.044)   -0.059(0.058)   
MBA -0.002(0.026)   -0.048(0.064)   0.117**(0.052)   0.188***(0.069)   
_Finance   0.003(0.021)   -0.026(0.033)   -0.038(0.043)   -0.070(0.052) 
_Operation   0.037*(0.020)   0.034(0.03)   -0.009(0.051)   0.012(0.049) 
   0.050*(0.026)   0.089*(0.052)   0.108*(0.063)   0.144**(0.071) 
LNBS 0.002(0.032) 0.020(0.029) -0.016(0.064) 0.014(0.053) -0.054(0.055) 0.010(0.055) -0.006(0.062) 0.026(0.068) 
Ind_outsiders -0.019(0.09) -0.013(0.088) 0.052(0.097) 0.048(0.098) 0.435*(0.235) 0.341(0.219) 0.679***(0.252) 0.645***(0.246) 
MGTCHAN -0.01(0.021) -0.005(0.021) 0.030(0.038) 0.043(0.039) -0.046(0.034) -0.045(0.034) 0.035(0.045) 0.027(0.043) 
Insiders -0.036(0.057) -0.064(0.048) 0.064(0.088) 0.004(0.093) 0.097(0.139) 0.004(0.105) 0.232(0.180) 0.201(0.140) 
MGTSHARE 0.040(0.046) 0.042(0.048) 0.025(0.052) 0.037(0.052) 0.066(0.07) 0.025(0.067) 0.082(0.082) 0.073(0.079) 
GEAR -0.024***(0.006) -0.025***(0.006) -0.023***(0.008) -0.024***(0.008) -0.014(0.013) -0.015(0.013) -0.022(0.018) -0.025(0.018) 
LNDURATION -0.032(0.022) -0.038*(0.020) -0.003(0.044) -0.006(0.04) 0.011(0.043) 0.021(0.043) -0.002(0.051) 0.004(0.051) 
LNSIZE 0.002(0.015) 0.000(0.003) -0.025(0.025) -0.035(0.024) 0.016(0.019) 0.008(0.020) 0.019(0.030) 0.020(0.030) 
Crisis -0.010(0.012) -0.012(0.012) 0.005(0.014) 0.001(0.024) -0.098**(0.046) -0.107**(0.050) -0.110*(0.061) -0.112*(0.061) 
Pre_ROA -0.057(0.047) -0.065(0.043) -0.045(0.057) -0.060(0.049) -0.146**(0.068) -0.142**(0.069) -0.017(0.029) -0.022(0.027) 
Lambda 0.030(0.06) 0.015(0.061) -0.155(0.109) -0.201**(0.101) 0.039(0.103) -0.001(0.167) 0.194(0.129) 0.197(0.123) 
Intercept -0.134(0.273) -0.070(0.281) 0.039(0.225) 0.178(0.221) -0.044(0.274) -0.008(0.242) -0.538(0.344) -0.573*(0.315) 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 (%) 11.11 11.48 7.85 9.67 16.16 14.99 16.36 14.93 
Chi2 63.006*** 44.647*** 39.552** 39.119** 177.870*** 164.792*** 63.773*** 68.628*** 
N 450 450 402 402 335 335 377 377 
Notes: This table reports the results of the panel regression corrected for sample selection bias for the effect of human capital of PE directors on post-SMBO performance, up to five years after 
SMBO transaction. The dependent variables (AROA, AROS, AEMPG, and ASALG) are estimated as industry-adjusted abnormal performance measures. Lambda is the fitted probability of 
receiving PE backing, estimated from the Probit regression model in Panel A of Table 6. Model 1,3,5,7 report the results of the impact of human capital resources of PE directors on post-SMBO 
performance. Model 2,4,6,8 report the results of the effect of complementary human capital resources between the buying and selling PE firms on performance. All the results are based on 99% 
winsorized data. All parameters of panel regressions are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error, omitted collinear covariates, and cluster by firm. Entry year 
dummies are included. P-values for the Wald test are for probability > Ch𝐢 𝟐. N reports the number of firm-year observations in the panel regression model. * p< 10%; ** p<5%, *** p<1%. 
Robust standard errors of regressions are reported in brackets. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
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Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 of Table 3 present results of the effect of complementary human capital 
resources between the buying and selling PE firms on performance. Coefficients for 
_Finance are not statistically significant, indicating that H3a is not supported. _Operation 
is weakly positively associated with AROA 2 (coefficient=0.037, p<0.07), implying that 
incoming PE directors with complementary human capital in terms of operational experience 
improve profitability measured by AROA, and providing some support for H3b. We also find 
that coefficients for complementary human capital in terms of high level business education 
(_MBA) are weakly positive and statistically significant in models for AROA 2 
(coefficient=0.050, p<0.06), AROS 4 (coefficient=0.089, p<0.09), AEMPG 6 
(coefficient=0.108, p<0.09), and ASALG 8 (coefficient=0.144, p<0.05). These results support 
our previous findings and imply positive effects of high level business education on post-
SMBO growth performance. These findings provide support for hypothesis 3c in terms of 
high level business education.  
 
These results are consistent with the summary statistics suggesting that PE directors with 
financial experience were most represented on boards followed by directors with operational 
experience and MBA degree. As expected, complementarity works better in deals where 
target buyouts lack a particular expertise (i.e. MBA). The R
2
s of models involving growth 
ratios are generally higher than those of the models of profitability, indicating that the board 
relevant variables exhibit higher explanatory power in growth models.  
 
Regarding control variables, we find that independent outsiders (Ind_outsiders) are 
significantly associated with growth ratios, suggesting that independent outside directors 
facilitate exploiting the growth opportunities. Ind_ outsiders are active CEOs of other firms 
and other experts such as: consultants, businessmen, and university professors. They possess 
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considerable experience-based human capital and thus provide an important advisory role. 
Our results (Tables 6 and 7) thus provide further evidence for the boards’ advisory role. Our 
results are in line with de Villiers, Naiker and van Staden (2011) who report an important 
advisory role of active CEOs on boards and their positive association with performance. 
Consistent with Cornelli and Karakaş (2013), CEO replacements are not associated with 
performance improvements. As expected, the recent financial crisis is negatively associated 
with employment growth and sales growth.  
 
5. Robustness checks  
5.1. Alternative proxies 
PE firms’ decisions to appoint PE directors onto boards may be affected by PE firms’ ability 
to identify good deals (Chahine and Goergen, 2011). Highly reputable PE firms are also more 
likely to identify good deals with less need to appoint PE directors. Syndicated deals and 
deals where top managers were replaced also require fewer appointments on boards. We also 
examine links between PE ownership and number of PE directors on the board, thus creating 
possibility that our results may be attributed to increasing PE ownership rather than 
involvement of PEDs. Hence, we re-estimate our Probit model with the above mentioned 
determinants affecting need for PE directors and re-run all GLS models with new Lambdas. 
Unreported results are economically and statistically consistent with the results reported in 
Tables 6 and 7. 
 
Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill (2013) point out the sensitivity of results to how human capital 
variables are measured. We therefore conduct robustness checks with two alternative 
(continues) measures: the percentage and the number of PE directors with financial 
experience, operational experience and MBA degree. Unreported results with two alternative 
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variables are economically and statistically consistent with our reported results for models 
using categorical variable for the human capital. 
 
We also checked for robustness by considering a more inclusive definition of PED which 
includes experts not on PE firms’ payroll. Those experts are however connected to PE firms 
and are proposed to portfolio companies by the PE firms. Unreported results are in line with 
results in Tables 6 and 7. Finally our results remain robust to use of PED as a categorical 
instead of PED as a continuous variable. 
 
5.2. Different types of PE firms 
Degeorge, Martin and Phalippou (2016) distinguish between PE firms with a margin focus 
(focused on increasing profits) and those with a growth focus (focused on increasing 
revenues). We therefore test for the possibility that results could be driven by type of 
investors rather than PED and their human capital. We distinguish between PE firms with a 
margin focus (Margin) and those with a growth focus (Growth). We control for the possibility 
that a PE firm with a growth focus might improve performance of a portfolio firm that has so 
far been sponsored by a PE firm with a margin focus (and vice versa) (Margin*Growth in 
Table 8; Panel A). The results (Panel A) show that the coefficients for PED remain positive 
and statistically significant in the models for AEMPG and ASALG. The coefficients for 
PED*Poor_ROA (see Panel A) are negative but not statistically significant.  
 
We also create further categorical variables for a buyer with margin focus and growth focus 
and interact them with relevant variables for skills and complementary human capital (Table 
8; Panels B and C). Overall operational skills and MBA education tend to work better in PE 
firms with Growth. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for Finance*BMargin 
in the model for AROS (model 4 in Panel B) provides some evidence that finance expertise 
31 
 
contributes to improvements in profitability. The results in models for the complementarity 
between two PE firms in relation to education (i.e. ΔMBA) and experience (i.e. ΔOperation, 
ΔFinance) are presented in Panel C. The reported results are consistent with previously 
reported results in our Table 7 (see page 25).   
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Table 8: Margin vs. Sales growers 
Panel A AROA AROS AEMPG ASALG 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
PED 0.077(0.07) 0.279**(0.117) -0.014(0.14) 0.203(0.159) 0.446**(0.208) 0.567***(0.198) 0.798***(0.244) 0.676***(0.177) 
PED*BMargin    -0.157(0.105)   -0.161(0.182)   -0.104(0.161)   0.076(0.171) 
BMargin -0.043(0.029) 0.000(0.042) -0.096**(0.048) -0.041(0.072) 0.024(0.035) 0.051(0.051) -0.137**(0.059) -0.107*(0.063) 
Margin*Growth 0.020(0.034) 0.034(0.033) -0.098**(0.05) -0.084*(0.047) 0.008(0.040) 0.013(0.041) -0.049(0.076) -0.027(0.069) 
PED*Poor_ROA   -0.346***(0.108)   -0.473(0.399)   -0.179(0.195)   -0.584**(0.262) 
Poor_ROA   0.199***(0.035)   0.212**(0.098)   0.098*(0.053)   0.168**(0.071) 
Controls included included included included included included included Included 
Years  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 
(%) 15.94 28.65 13.9 16.6 27.93 28.2 21.59 26.99 
Chi2 54.245*** 95.551*** 26.892 35.768 115.346*** 108.398*** 1316.693*** 1475.367*** 
N 356 356 327 327 266 266 316 316 
 
Panel B AROA AROS AEMPG ASALG 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Finance 0.058**(0.026) 0.047(0.029) 0.102*(0.053) 0.040(0.033) 0.112(0.075) 0.053(0.059) 0.008(0.085) -0.053(0.074) 
Operation 0.029(0.021) 0.020(0.025) 0.040(0.040) 0.031(0.041) 0.056(0.049) 0.137***(0.045) -0.023(0.069) 0.074(0.071) 
MBA -0.010(0.028) 0.074**(0.037) -0.076(0.070) 0.099(0.075) 0.119**(0.051) 0.073*(0.042) 0.217***(0.075) 0.117(0.08) 
Finance*BMargin   0.018(0.036)   0.113*(0.063)   0.135(0.089)   0.154(0.109) 
Operation*BMargin   0.005(0.032)   -0.018(0.064)   
-
0.184***(0.068) 
  -0.171*(0.094) 
MBA*BMargin   -0.124**(0.053)   -0.248**(0.111)   0.072(0.09)   0.169(0.114) 
BMargin -0.046(0.03) -0.023(0.043) -0.102**(0.05) -0.096(0.064) 0.049(0.04) -0.008(0.063) -0.113**(0.057) -0.218**(0.106) 
Margin*Growth 0.015(0.032) 0.032(0.032) -0.114**(0.051) -0.078*(0.042) 0.042(0.046) 0.045(0.043) -0.031(0.084) -0.026(0.079) 
Controls included included included included included included included included 
Years  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
(%) 17.91 18.79 13.1 15.87 30.2 33.26 22.66 25.09 
Chi2 75.463*** 89.059*** 32.045 38.163 99.902*** 116.939*** 1170.555*** 1227.644*** 










Panel C AROA AROS AEMPG ASALG 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ΔOperation 0.029(0.025) 0.039(0.035) 0.012(0.044) 0.042(0.061) 0.020(0.041) 0.098*(0.055) -0.000(0.062) -0.063(0.063) 
ΔFinance -0.009(0.029) -0.043(0.029) -0.034(0.041) -0.082**(0.037) -0.032(0.038) -0.034(0.047) -0.094(0.062) -0.158**(0.078) 
ΔMBA 0.061**(0.027) 0.101***(0.037) 0.080(0.058) 0.140*(0.082) 0.082*(0.048) 0.056(0.052) 0.214***(0.078) 0.231**(0.095) 
ΔFinance* BMargin   0.070(0.051)   0.091(0.078)   0.004(0.093)   0.117(0.121) 
ΔOperation*BMargin   -0.023(0.051)   -0.060(0.084)   -0.184*(0.102)   0.113(0.124) 
ΔMBA*BMargin   -0.072(0.052)   -0.108(0.108)   0.117(0.148)   -0.024(0.155) 
BMargin -0.042(0.028) -0.039(0.036) -0.095**(0.046) -0.078(0.06) 0.029(0.035) 0.054(0.045) -0.137**(0.057) -0.192**(0.082) 
Margin*Growth 0.027(0.033) 0.035(0.033) -0.089**(0.043) -0.073*(0.039) 0.019(0.043) 0.026(0.047) -0.050(0.077) -0.051(0.073) 
Controls included included included included included included included included 
Years  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
(%) 18.63 19.6 15.41 17.1 27.48 28.25 23.03 23.87 
Chi2 58.864*** 69.090*** 31.027 32.398 119.02*** 90.59*** 1424.538*** 1445.160*** 
N 356 356 327 327 266 266 316 316 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of the panel regression corrected for sample selection bias for the effect of PE directors and their human capital resources on post-SMBO performance, after 
interacting with the dummy variable of PE types (BMargin). BMargin is a dummy variable that takes one if the PE firm is margin focus and zero if the PE firm is growth focus. Control variable 
Margin*Growth is a dummy variable that equals one if a growth focus PE firm buys the company from a margin focus PE firm, and zero otherwise. The dependent variables (AROA, AROS, 
AEMPG, and ASALG) are estimated as industry-adjusted abnormal performance measures. Panel A reports the results of the impact of PE directors. Panel B reports the results of the impact of 
human capital resources. Panel C reports the results of the impact of complementary human capital resources between the buying and selling PE firms. Model 1,3,5,7 of all Panels report the 
regression results without interaction term. Model 2,4,6,8 of all three Panels report the regression results after interacting BMargin with relevant variables for PE directors and their human 
capital resources. All the results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters of panel regressions are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error, omitted 
collinear covariates, and cluster by firm. All other control variables and entry year dummies are included. P-values for the Wald test are for probability > Chi 2. N reports the number of firm-year 










5.3. Pre-SMBO performance 
We further examine our findings on lack of statistical significance for Operational 
experience, and examine possibility that Operational skills could be valuable in poorly 
performing firms but not in well performing firms, which could erode the significance of the 
overall effect. The results are presented in Table 9. After including a categorical variable for 
poor performing pre-SMBO companies, our results for Operational experience remain 
consistent with the results reported in Table 7. MBA educational background however plays a 
particularly important role in the performance of poorly performing portfolio companies. 
 
Table 9: Poor-performers (Poor_ROA) 
Panel A: Experience and education- based human capital 
  AROA AROS AEMPG ASALG 
Finance 0.058**(0.027) 0.085*(0.05) 0.099(0.076) 0.000(0.020) 
Operation -0.003(0.017) 0.013(0.028) 0.007(0.041) -0.034(0.067) 
MBA -0.016(0.027) -0.095*(0.056) 0.038(0.041) 0.157**(0.076) 
Finance*Poor_ROA -0.020(0.032) 0.004(0.071) -0.153(0.106) 0.053(0.128) 
Operation*Poor_ROA 0.013(0.057) 0.041(0.108) -0.11(0.119) -0.126(0.105) 
MBA*Poor_ROA 0.067(0.077) 0.425**(0.175) 0.481***(0.142) 0.129(0.13) 
Poor_ROA 0.127***(0.034) 0.056(0.097) 0.118*(0.064) 0.145(0.142) 
LNBS -0.004(0.031) -0.020(0.060) -0.063(0.054) -0.029(0.062) 
Ind_outsiders -0.069(0.089) -0.052(0.095) 0.412**(0.185) 0.553**(0.231) 
MGTCHAN -0.017(0.021) 0.017(0.031) -0.057*(0.031) 0.042(0.044) 
Insiders -0.057(0.056) -0.001(0.077) 0.050(0.132) 0.210(0.179) 
MGTSHARE 0.049(0.047) 0.046(0.048) 0.072(0.068) 0.103(0.080) 
GEAR -0.024***(0.007) -0.021***(0.008) -0.011(0.012) -0.024(0.018) 
LNDURATION -0.020(0.020) 0.015(0.031) 0.020(0.037) 0.004(0.053) 
LNSIZE -0.001(0.013) -0.029(0.023) 0.008(0.019) 0.020(0.030) 
Crisis -0.010(0.012) 0.006(0.013) -0.086*(0.045) -0.112*(0.060) 
Lambda -0.013(0.057) -0.158*(0.085) 0.010(0.1030) 0.184(0.132) 
Intercept -0.189(0.263) 0.002(0.182) -0.015(0.246) -0.626**(0.319) 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
(%) 18.8 19.5 22.59 19.76 
Chi2 78.348*** 65.956*** 219.527*** 80.700*** 












Panel B: Complementarity of human capital  
  AROA AROS AEMPG ASALG 
ΔFinance 0.027(0.022) 0.011(0.025) 0.009(0.043) 0.021(0.06) 
ΔOperation 0.040(0.027) 0.035(0.033) 0.043(0.042) -0.056(0.062) 
ΔMBA 0.023(0.026) -0.015(0.034) 0.015(0.051) 0.131*(0.079) 
ΔFinance*Poor_ROA -0.124**(0.049) -0.132(0.09) -0.207**(0.086) -0.021(0.118) 
ΔOperation*Poor_ROA 0.028(0.058) 0.052(0.099) -0.128(0.102) -0.087(0.125) 
ΔMBA*Poor_ROA 0.003(0.064) 0.393***(0.141) 0.269*(0.144) 0.026(0.205) 
Poor_ROA 0.155***(0.038) 0.095(0.095) 0.135**(0.061) 0.169*(0.098) 
LNBS 0.011(0.029) -0.005(0.045) 0.008(0.043) 0.009(0.07) 
Ind_outsiders -0.053(0.088) -0.043(0.097) 0.186(0.135) 0.540**(0.231) 
MGTCHAN -0.015(0.021) 0.013(0.031) -0.054**(0.026) 0.028(0.043) 
Insiders -0.082*(0.044) -0.040(0.077) -0.038(0.072) 0.185(0.134) 
MGTSHARE 0.053(0.048) 0.059(0.047) 0.044(0.06) 0.085(0.082) 
GEAR -0.024***(0.006) -0.021***(0.008) -0.005(0.01) -0.027(0.018) 
 LNDURATION -0.025(0.02) 0.014(0.031) 0.000(0.015) 0.012(0.049) 
LNSIZE -0.002(0.011) -0.028(0.022) 0.005(0.02) 0.019(0.032) 
Crisis -0.013(0.012) 0.001(0.018) -0.089**(0.041) -0.115*(0.063) 
Lambda -0.035(0.056) -0.188**(0.093) -0.028(0.098) 0.172(0.13) 
Intercept -0.157(0.261) 0.051(0.206) 0.012(0.207) -0.659**(0.316) 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
(%) 19.37 23.26 21.29 18.02 
Chi2 65.991*** 75.562*** 217.453*** 86.891*** 
N 450 402 335 377 
Notes: This table reports the results of the panel regression corrected for sample selection bias for the effect of PE human 
capital resources and complementary of human capital on post-SMBO performance, after interacting with the dummy 
variable for poor performing pre-SMBO companies (Poor_ROA). The dependent variables (AROA, AROS, AEMPG, and 
ASALG) are estimated as industry-adjusted abnormal performance measures. Lambda is the fitted probability of receiving PE 
backing, estimated from the Probit regression model in Table 6. Panel A reports the results of the impact of human capital 
resources, after interacting with Poor_ROA. Panel B reports the results of the impact of complementary human capital 
resources between the buying and selling PE firms, after interacting with Poor_ROA. All the results are based on 99% 
winsorized data. All parameters of panel regressions are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard 
error, omitted collinear covariates, and cluster by firm. Entry year dummies are included. P-values for the Wald test are for 
probability > Chi 𝟐. N reports the number of firm-year observations in the panel regression model. * p< 10%; ** p<5%, *** 
p<1%. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.   All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
5.4. Other robustness checks 
Some previous studies suggest that the monitoring role should play a larger role in deals 
where managerial ownership is greater, as this creates more agency problems. We therefore 
repeated our estimates in subsamples with large (i.e. top quartile) and small (i.e. bottom 
quartile) management ownership stakes. Our results suggest stronger link between directors 
with financial expertise and increased profitability in deals with higher agency costs.  
We also repeat our estimates after controlling for both Ind_outsiders and other outsiders. 




6. Discussion and conclusion  
This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper providing evidence that PE partners and 
executives as directors play important monitoring and advisory roles in post-SMBO 
performance. We make several contributions. 
 
First, we add to literature on the sustainability of corporate governance by exploring the 
changing nature of PE partners and executives on boards in the SMBO context. Building on 
the complementarity between agency and strategic entrepreneurship perspectives, we suggest 
that PE directors help in providing both close monitoring and better advice on mitigating 
agency costs and exploiting growth opportunities in SMBOs. Our findings provide support 
and clearly highlight the importance of PE directors for performance improvements, and 
growth performance especially. For instance, we show that the fraction of PE directors has a 
positive impact on post-SMBO employment and sales growth. Results regarding poorly 
performing buyouts show they require more PE directors to increase the same level of growth 
ratios than other deals, suggesting that monitoring and advisory roles of PE directors are 
necessary to improve performance.  
 
Further, we reveal the importance of exploring the heterogeneity of human capital within PE 
firms rather than treating particular PE firms as homogeneous. Consistent with previous 
studies (Acharya et al., 2013), we find that human capital of PE directors matters, especially 
PE directors with high level business education in relation to growth. However, consistent 
with Degeorge, Martin and Phalippou (2016) we find no significantly positive effects of PE 
directors’ operational experience on post SMBO performance. Complementarity in buying 
and selling PE firms works in relation to high level business education, and only weakly in 
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respect to operational experience.  
 
However, in contrast with Degeorge, Martin and Phalippou (2016) we do not find strong 
evidence of the impact of a complementary financial and operational set of skills on post-
SMBO performance. It could be that Degeorge, Martin and Phalippou (2016) treat the PE 
firm as a whole and their human capital variables are measured only at PE firm level. By 
using portfolio companies (i.e. buyouts) level data we examine the importance of human 
capital at board (i.e. deal) level. This yielded interesting results that PE firms with a growth 
focus tend to appointing significantly more directors with an MBA degree, while directors 
with an MBA have a particularly significant impact in SMBOs that were previously poorly 
performing buyouts. 
 
We also examine the impact of human capital on specific aspects of performance akin to 
agency (e.g. profitability) and entrepreneurship (e.g. growth) perspectives. Separate 
examination of the impact of human capital on different aspects of performance is not 
possible based on composite measures obtained from PE firms (i.e. internal rate of return 
(IRR)). In addition, by relying on publicly available (and audited) accounting data on 
portfolio companies we avoid selection bias associated with obtaining data from PE firms 
and/or investors. 
 
Second, we extend board research showing the importance of human capital composition 
(e.g. Chahine and Goergen, 2011; Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013) to a new context. In 
particular, we add to growing evidence that to understand the sustainability of boards 
fulfilling their roles (Goergen and Renneboog, 2014). It is important to consider the 
ownership and life-cycle nature of the firm concerned. Prior studies have considered a variety 
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of entrepreneurial firm types such as high tech startups (e.g. Bertoni, Colombo and Croce, 
2013; Knockaert, Bjornali and Erikson, 2015; Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013), VC backed 
firms (Chahine and Goergen, 2011) and family firms (Bammens, Voordeckers and Van Gils, 
2011; Wilson, Wright and Scholes, 2013). SMBOs extend these contexts to introduce a 
dynamic aspect by recognizing that entrepreneurial firms transitioning to a next stage in their 
life-cycle experience specific changes in their boards’ human capital composition that impact 
performance.  
 
Third, we extend the agency theory perspective by incorporating the strategic 
entrepreneurship perspective as a complementary theory in the SMBO context, and as such 
we respond to calls for more multi-theoretical work on corporate governance. Agency theory 
suggests SMBO are unlikely to make significant further performance improvement due to the 
exhausted benefits from agency costs reduction in the primary buyout (Wang, 2012; 
Achleitner and Figge, 2014). We argue agency conflicts may still exist in SMBOs and, 
according to the strategic entrepreneurship perspective (Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 
2001; Meuleman et al., 2009), new PE partners and executives may bring new resources and 
capacities to identify and exploit growth opportunities. Hence, there is still performance 
improvement potential. Moreover, prior works focus on the financial monitoring role of PE 
partners and executives on board and its effect on profitable efficiency almost exclusively 
examines primary buyouts (Guo, Hotchkiss and Song, 2011; Cornelli and Karakaş, 2013).  
 
Our findings have managerial implications regarding the sustainability of boards involving 
PE directors. High level business education appears an important human capital resource of 
PE directors to improve post-SMBO growth performance. Financial experts skilled in 
financial monitoring and cost-cutting strategies can continue to squeeze the cost-cutting 
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potentials of SMBOs to improve profitability. However, we do not find financial experience 
contributes to growth performance, inconsistent with the argument that financial experts are 
specialized in growth through M&A deals. Given the importance of M&A for growth in 
SMBOs (Wang, 2012), our findings that financial experience does not contribute to growth 
performance emphasizes the need to focus on the right PE director expertise to realize growth 
opportunities. The implication from our surprising finding of no strong evidence that 
operational experience improves performance especially revenue growth is that operational 
PE directors may not have the specific expertise and skills required by their portfolio 
companies to boost revenue growth. Instead, the implication is for PE firms to introduce 
independent directors with skills that complement the absent operational skills of their own 
staff. As a significant part of the UK economy therefore, our findings have important 
implications in considering how firms and their financial backers recruit the most appropriate 
members of the board team to make a positive social and economic impact, particularly with 
respect to the role of independent directors.    
 
We also acknowledge some limitations of our study which suggest avenues for further 
research. First, our analysis does not distinguish types of growth strategies. Prior studies 
indicate that various PE partners and executives have various expertise on growth strategies. 
For instance, financial experts prefer acquisitions while operational experts are specialized in 
organic growth strategies such as revenue growth. Further research may try to obtain data to 
associate the human capital of PE partners and executives with specific growth strategies they 
use for their portfolio companies. Second, although we find that SMBOs benefit from the 
monitoring and advice of PE directors, we do not entirely separate the impact of monitoring 
and advice. We do however report an important advisory role of independent outsiders (active 
CEOs of other (non-affiliated) companies, consultants, businessmen and university 
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professors), in line with our argument that agency/monitoring issues are likely to be 
addressed in the primary buyouts and that, therefore, the advisory role plays is more 
important in SMBOs.  
 
We also do not directly examine how PE directors use their expertise and skills to collaborate 
with other board members and/or top managers and facilitate the decision making process. 
Further research would benefit from directly investigating the roles of PE directors on board 
decision making process. Third, the measures we use for human capital of PE directors are 
generic. Specifically regarding the operational experience, we are unable to check the specific 
operational experience such as sales, marketing, innovation, or industry. Future research may 
seek to match the specific experience of PE directors with growth strategies and performance 
effects. Fourth, we examine some human capital factors of PE directors. PE directors also 
have other human capital factors. For instance, PE directors with international expansion 
experience may give a better knowledge and skills that facilitate the international expansion 
of some SMBOs. 
 
Despite these limitations, our paper demonstrates that governance benefits are not exhausted 
in primary buyouts but the effects in secondary buyouts depend on the nature of PE directors’ 
human capital resource, notably in respect of the balance between board monitoring and 
advisory roles. Our study thus helps develop understanding of the importance of taking a 
fine-grained perspective of human capital resources of PE directors in future research on 
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Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
Description Variable Definition 
Performance measures 
Profitability   
Abnormal return 
on assets 
AROA AROA is difference between a company actual and expected ROA, in post-
SMBO years (Barber and Lyon, 1996). ROA is a company’s earnings before 
interests and taxes (EBIT) scaled by the total assets in the same year. 
Expected ROA is a company’s median ROA, during 3-year period before the 
SMBO, adjusted for the change in ROA in a respective industry. The 
industry’s change is the difference between median ROA of the industry in 
each of the post-SMBO years and the industry's 3-year median ROA before 
SMBO. Sample SMBOs are classified into nine broad industries in line with 
the management and technology expertise in the venture capital industry 
(Gompers et al., 2008).  
Abnormal return 
on sales 
AROS AROS is difference between a company actual and expected ROA, in post-
SMBO years (Barber and Lyon, 1996). ROS is a company’s earnings before 
interests and taxes (EBIT) scaled by the total sales in the same year. Expected 
ROS is a company’s median ROS, during 3-year period before the SMBO, 
adjusted for the change in ROS in a respective industry. The industry’s 
change is the difference between median ROS of the industry in each of the 
post-SMBO years and the industry's 3-year median ROS before SMBO. 
Sample SMBOs are classified into nine broad industries in line with the 
management and technology expertise in the venture capital industry 
(Gompers et al., 2008).  




AEMPG AEMPG is difference between a company actual and expected EMPG, in 
post-SMBO years (Barber and Lyon, 1996). EMPG is the difference between 
the company’s end of year number of employees in year t and year t-1, scaled 
by the average of number of employees in year t and t-1. Expected EMPG is a 
company’s median EMPG, during 3-year period before the SMBO, adjusted 
for the change in EMPG in a respective industry. The industry’s change is the 
difference between median EMPG of the industry in each of the post-SMBO 
years and the industry's median EMPG before SMBO. Sample SMBOs are 
classified into nine broad industries in line with the management and 
technology expertise in the venture capital industry (Gompers et al., 2008).  
Abnormal sales 
growth 
ASALG ASALG is difference between a company actual and expected SALG, in post-
SMBO years (Barber and Lyon, 1996). SALG is the difference between the 
company’s sales in year t and year t-1, scaled by the average of sales in year t 
and t-1. Expected SALG is a company’s median SALG, during 3-year period 
before the SMBO, adjusted for the change in SALG in a respective industry. 
The industry’s change is the difference between median SALG of the industry 
in each of the post-SMBO years and the industry's median SALG before 
SMBO. Sample SMBOs are classified into nine broad industries in line with 
the management and technology expertise in the venture capital industry 







of PE directors 
on the board 
 PED The number of PE partners and executives who appear on PE firms’ payroll 




A categorical variable taking the value of 1 if at least one PE director in year t 
worked in finance, accounting or banking related job before joining PE 
industry, and 0 otherwise. 
 
_Finance 
A categorical variable taking the value of 1 if at least one buying PE director 




A categorical variable taking the value of 1 if at least one PE director on the 
board in year t at least once in his or her professional career worked in a 
consulting (a company designated as providing consulting services) or 
industry job that was not finance, accounting or banking related before 
joining PE industry, and 0 otherwise. 
 
_Operation 
A categorical variable taking the value of 1 if at least one buying PE director 





A categorical variable taking the value of 1 if at least one PE director in year t 
holds a MBA degree, and 0 otherwise.  
 _MBA A categorical variable taking the value of 1 if at least one buying PE director 
in year t has MBA degree, while all selling PE directors do not have. 
Controls 
  




Ind_outsiders The number of independent outside directors without obvious relationships 
with sample portfolio companies (e.g. active CEOs of other (non-affiliated) 
companies, consultants, businessmen and university professors), divided by 
board size in year t.  
Change in top 
management 
MGTCHAN A categorical variable which equals 1 if the CEO and/or CFO is replaced 




Insiders The number of inside directors divided by board size in year t. 
Management 
share 
MGTSHARE The percentage of target company’s common equity contributed by the 
management in year t. 
Leverage  GEAR The sum of long term and short term debt divided by the total equity in year t. 
Business service 
industry 
BSERVICES A categorical variable equals 1 for a SMBO from Business Service industry 
and 0 otherwise. 
Companies’ size  LNSIZE 
The natural logarithm of SMBO value in £ million. 
Financial crisis   Crisis A categorical variable which equals 1 for observations from 2008-2010. 
Pre-SMBO 
performance 
Pre_ROA The performance ratio in the form of industry adjusted ROA in year preceding 
the SMBO transaction. 




DURATION The number of months from the SMBO date to the exit date, if the SMBO 
was exited; or the number of months from the SMBO date to the sample’s 
cut-off date (30/06/2015), if the SMBO was not exited. 
 LNDURATION The natural logarithm of DURATION.  
47 
 
Lambda Lambda The fitted probability of receiving PE backing, estimated by Probit model. 
Deal Type BUYIN A categorical variable which equals 1 if the SMBO is a buy-in. 
Previous PE 
backing 
Pre_PE A categorical variable that takes 1 if a SMBO is PE backed in primary stage; 
and 0 otherwise. 
Types of PE 
firms  
BMargin A categorical variable that takes 1 if the buying PE firm focuses on margin 
and 0 if the buying PE firm focuses on growth. 
 Margin 
*Growth 
A categorical variable that takes 1 if the selling PE firm focuses on margin 
while the buying PE firm focuses on growth, and 0 otherwise.  
 
